systems'. 10 Artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies have seen considerable advancement in the commercial sector, which is leaving the military sector behind. 11 States are beginning to note the need to "catch up with Silicon Valley". 12 Seeking to tap into the advancements made in the commercial sector, the creation of weapons systems with some level of autonomy has recently become a key focus for the U.S. Department of Defense through Project Maven. When establishing the project in 2017, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work stated that 'the Department of Defense (DoD) must integrate artificial intelligence and machine learning more effectively across operations to maintain advantages over increasingly capable adversaries and competitors'. 13 While Project Maven is currently focusing on the incorporation of algorithms into military operations, reflecting the current state of technological advancement, it seeks to consider and promote 'all initiatives that develop, employ, or field, artificial intelligence, automation, machine learning, deep learning and computer vision algorithms'.
14 In other words, Project Maven is not only creating more complex algorithms but is also actively seeking to ensure that the U.S. is at the forefront of the development of autonomous weapons technologies.
In this paper I argue that feminist posthumanist theory is an important paradigm through which to understand our relationship to technology, and to autonomous weapons systems in particular. Feminist posthumanism uses technology (alongside the nonhuman animal and matter) to question what it means to be human, deconstructing the very notion of what the human is, noting that the concept of the human in dominant Western accounts of subjectivity creates hierarchies between humans as well as between the human and other living beings. 15 A clear example of the way in which feminist posthuman theory challenges humanist accounts of subjectivity can be seen in Donna Haraway's work. Haraway notes that humans are already cyborgs in that they are deeply connected to, desire, and are dependent upon technology. 16 Such an understanding of technology is essential to understanding autonomous weapons systems. In noting the connection between the human and machine and deconstructing distinctions between autonomy and automation, a posthuman perspective on autonomous weapons foregrounds the need to focus not only on autonomous weapons but on the broad array of delegated killing. While current attempts at legal regulation distinguish between civil and military technologies, such a distinction becomes impossible in light of the clear links between civil and military technologies and the killing potential of many technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI) . 17 This article therefore contributes to legal studies as well as the discourse on autonomous weapons. It further contributes to feminist approaches to international law, inserting such approaches into the realm of military technologies and highlighting the relevance of feminist approaches to all areas of international law. 18 Law and gender theory is an important lens through which to analyse military technologies. 19 Military technologies touch on several political and philosophical issues that gender theorists have long discussed. Legal articulations of subjectivity in particular are something that feminist legal theory has long problematised, and is directly relevant to the question of the 'legal person' as machines become more and more autonomous. 20 This may require legal change to allow for 'electronic' subject-recognition. 21 In addition to this, gender theories have developed a nuanced set of tools through which to analyse issues around inclusion, exclusion and justice. This can be seen in gender theory's commitment to intersectionality, which looks at gender alongside race, sexuality, ability, class, etc. 22 A gender perspective ensures the consideration of the multiple ways in which technologies may impact on intersecting groups, which may be missed in mainstream discussions about the use of autonomous weapons systems.
Despite the many debates on autonomous weapons, there has been little consideration of such systems from a feminist posthuman perspective. 23 Mary Manjikian appears to be the only 17 25 Heeding Manjikian's suspicion of the hyper-masculinity of militarism, this article works in the vein of Haraway and other feminist posthuman thinkers such as Rosi Braidotti and the 'xenofeminists', a collective of scholars working under the name 'Laboria Cuboniks' who seek to use and appropriate technology for feminist aims -to think critically about the significance of autonomous weapons systems, for the ways in which law fashions our understanding of human subjectivity. 26 This paper adds to the discourse on autonomous weapons by proposing a xenofeminist posthuman perspective, providing a different way of understanding these systems while contributing to the development of feminist approaches to international law.
While Haraway is fundamentally positive about technology's potential to be used for feminist aims, she notes that feminists must also ensure that technology is not used to create 'the final abstraction embodied in a Star Wars apocalypse waged in the name of defence, about the final appropriation of women's bodies in a masculinist orgy of war.' 27 Haraway also notes that technology is embedded within capitalism, pointing out the fact that the people usually making the machines are often poor women from the Global South. 28 Haraway's work seeks to create a feminist techno-future in spite of and while trying to avoid the risks of a possible hyper-masculine techno-future. While Haraway seeks to promote the use of technology for feminist aims, the Xenofeminist Manifesto (XFM) has a more focused feminist project in mind. The XFM seeks to destroy capitalism through the accelerated use of technology to create a post-work world, thereby directly advocating for post-capitalism as a feminist aim. 29 Thus, the XFM insists not only on the need to accelerate our use of/dependence upon technology, but also to appropriate this technology for feminist aims, ensuring that such technology remains loyal to the politics they wish it to promote. Such feminist aims include the will to ensure the free distribution of hormones or the will to use technology to restructure gendered systems of reproductive labour and care. 30 the dilemmas technology brings and the need to 'explicit[ly] acknowledge… these conditions as a target for elimination', they do not address the fact that the creation of a post-capitalist world will not be not immediate. 31 In the meantime, as Haraway notes, science and technology have both contributed to and changed the face of 'late capitalism', with more work becoming precarious and being done at home, which affects women and people of colour most. 32 Technology is largely designed by (and profits) people who are white, male and living in the Global North, while the raw materials are mined and manufactured elsewhere, by others.
33
While some xenofeminist scholars propose the ubiquitous use of technology as the way to a feminist future, that future is less utopic when one considers that much technology is developed, first and foremost, for military purposes. 34 While there has not yet been a feminist posthuman reading of autonomous weapons systems which seeks to dissect the false binaries upheld within the debates on these weapons between the human-machine and autonomyautomation, there has been some limited engagement with these systems from a feminist perspective by NGOs, one example being the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom's disarmament programme, 'Reaching Critical Will'. They consider the masculine nature of militarism and the ways in which this would only likely get worse if machines stripped of empathy engage in killing, instead of soldiers in face-to-face combat.
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It is interesting to note that many of the posthuman perspectives which currently exist on the topic of conflict and technology do come from a gender perspective. These works come from outside the legal discipline, however, and tend to focus on drone warfare. 36 Posthuman theory, however, could have a key impact if applied to legal studies and the debates around autonomous weapons. 37 In refusing to see the machine as other, noting the links between the One way in which hormones can be appropriated, drawing on xenofeminist methods to re-appropriate science and technology and make it our own, can be through creating home grown hormones and teaching others the same know-how. The project Open Source Gender Codes is one such example of this. The project aims to create plants which would allow people to grow their own sex hormones at home. This project, if it or something like it succeeds, would not only massively challenge the pharmaceutical industry who produce these hormones, but would also allow people to make safe choices about whether or not they wish to take hormones outside the institutional contexts of the state and medicine. This could also, potentially, drastically change cultural attitudes to the taking of hormones, making transitioning more culturally acceptable due to its accessibility and lack of institutional framework. 37 While there have been those who note the need to pay attention to the delegation of decision-making to technologies, such approaches have not, as far as this author is aware, been applied in conjunction with machine and the human, a posthuman approach would refuse the exceptionalism promoted by existing discourses on autonomous weapons, allowing for discussions to encompass a wider range of human-machine life/death decision-making. Killing machines may not be created as killer robots but may come into existence through other civil or military technological developments, such as artificial intelligence (AI) which may not have been designed to kill, but may ultimately be used to kill. 38 More mundane but equally dangerous are developments in algorithm-driven decision-making. 39 Further to this, given the vast advances in wearable military technologies and human enhancement technologies, a killer machine of the dystopian kind envisaged by many NGOs may, in fact, come about through technologically enhancing soldiers and turning them into superhuman soldiers. While such cyborg soldiers would not be deemed autonomous weapons under existing understandings of such systems, they will beg the same ethical questions around control and accountability, something which has not yet been recognised by the existing work on autonomous weapons. After all, at what point does a technologically mediated human become more machine than human?
While job automation may indeed help create a post-work, post-capitalist society, 40 such systems pose vast ethical issues around control and accountability. 'Fully automated luxury communism' seems less luxurious in the face of machines taking professional killing jobs.
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Drawing on the XFM, this article concludes by proposing the need for a posthumanxenofeminist discourse on autonomous weapons systems and other civil and military technologies. This means that we do not need to 'abandon' technology, but rather to use it warily, drawing on the wisdom of intersectional critiques and seeking a post-capitalist vision of society. 42 This article therefore makes several key contributions. First, the paper adds to the debate on 'autonomous' weapons by challenging existing definitions of such systems. The paper also analyses the international debates on these systems from the as-yet unapplied perspective of posthuman-xenofeminism, highlighting both what feminist posthuman and xenofeminist theory may add to the debates on autonomous weapons systems. Further, this article adds to feminist approaches to international law by situating them within discussions of autonomous weapons, proposing a new posthuman-xenofeminist methodology for such approaches. I conclude that there is a need for feminist posthuman intervention into the legal regulation of all technologies -one that understands the ways in which humans-machines work in connection while seeking to prevent the creation of all killer machines, thereby refusing current attempts at technological legal regulation which distinguish between civil and military technologies. 
Automation, the Autonomous and the Artificially Intelligent
There are currently a few definitions for autonomous weapons. The U.S. and U.K. governments, the UN Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Execution and Human Rights Watch all use a similar definition: 'robotic weapon systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.' 44 It is important to note that the definition must include 'once activated', as human control is always present when making and programming the machine. Full autonomy cannot be reached without the machines programming, designing and making themselves. Autonomous weapons are not drones. Drones are pilotless vehicles controlled remotely by humans. Autonomous weapons 'go considerably further than drones': 45 they would have no human guidance after being programmed, either being controlled through high-level algorithms or through artificial intelligence. Autonomous weapons thus potentially range from programmed sentry guns to intelligent humanoid soldier-robots. Whilst it is broadly agreed that autonomy has yet to be achieved, research is on-going in this area. 46 Most agree that autonomous weapons do not yet exist. However, this is somewhat debatable depending on the way autonomy is defined.
Robotic systems of varying levels of autonomy and lethality have already been deployed in numerous states. 47 One such system includes the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) system. The PAC system is able to select, target and hit incoming missiles, small aircraft and drones, without human intervention. 48 The system does not operate entirely independently: up to three officers watch over it at all times from what is called an Engagement Control Centre (ECS). The operators can let the system run in automatic mode but they are able to intervene to deselect or choose targets. Human involvement is therefore present, but largely as a backup. Both the operator and computer are able to make decisions on whether an incoming entity is a friend or an enemy. 49 Whilst the previous PAC-2 system relied on the ECS for guidance once launched, the latest PAC-3 missile also includes its own radar transmitter and guidance computer, allowing it to guide itself once launched and therefore allowing it to change course if necessary.
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Perhaps one of the 'most' autonomous systems out there is the Samsung SGR-A1. The SGR-A1 is an immobile sentry gun deployed on the border between North and South Korea. 51 The system can detect potential enemies using infra-red up to 4km away. It uses a low light 44 camera and pattern recognition software to determine whether a target is human, animal or matter. The SGR-A1 also uses voice recognition software to identify approaching persons. It can command someone to surrender and to not move closer. It can then, accordingly, when the person gets within 10m of the system, choose to sound an alarm or fire either rubber or real bullets. Whilst this decision is usually to be made by a human who watches over the system, the system does have a fully automatic mode where it can be set to decide itself. 52 While some automatic or semi-autonomous weapons systems clearly already exist and are in use, full autonomy is a long way off. Autonomy is distinguished from automation -with automated systems being pre-programmed machines used to perform specific tasks and autonomous machines being able to make decisions themselves in changing and diverse conditions, thus being able to select from multiple options as opposed to being predictable in their processes. 53 Thus, whilst automated machines may be 'making decisions' whether to fire or not, they do not make thought out decisions as they ultimately work through binary algorithms in a specific, set environment, never learning from their behaviour. Automated systems supposedly do what they are told to do: they are predictable in as much as they will act as predicted within the set of conditions predicted when they were made. Thus, according to Jeangène Vilmer, the sorts of systems discussed above are automated, not autonomous.
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Despite this, the debate as to whether these machines are actually automated or autonomous is contentious. Ambassador Michael Biontino of Germany has highlighted the difficulties of definition here, noting that 'there are a number of different proposals as to where to draw the line between "autonomous" and "automated"… and probably, our understanding as to where to draw this line will even evolve over time as technological advances are made'. 55 At the international level, levels of autonomy are discussed in terms of whether the system includes the human in, on or out-of-the-loop. 56 Human-out-of-the-loop machines are machines which independently select targets without supervision. Jeangène Vilmer states that these machines only currently exist against solely material targets, with electronic jamming systems being an example.
57 These types of systems are then distinguished from human-inthe-loop systems and human-on-the-loop systems. Human-in-the-loop systems are systems where the decision to fire is made by a human, whereas human-on-the-loop is defined as those which 'independently designate and process tasks while fully under the supervision of a human, capable of interrupting its actions', 58 PAC being an example here. All these categories sit somewhere between the lines of autonomy and automation. The debate around autonomous weapons at the international level, therefore, is mostly about whether humanout-of-the-loop systems should be allowed and to what extent. Human-out-of-the-loop systems are thus considered to be the dangerous types of machines, with the assumption being that these systems do not yet exist and that this paradigm amounts to autonomy. However, whether autonomous weapons yet exist or not depends on perspective. Jeangène Vilmer, for example, defines PAC-3 as a human-on-the-loop system as it is fully automated yet always supervised by a human. 59 The PAC-3 system, however, can independently select targets, decide whether a target is an enemy target or not, fire and accurately target even once released. Such a system could be defined as autonomous depending on how autonomy is defined. While the human does remain on-the-loop, the system does not require this to work. It seems that PAC-3, however, could possibly not be defined as autonomous as it works in specific conditions based on a set of algorithms as opposed to making complex decisions and learning. However, it is unclear at what point algorithmic programming may become so advanced that it becomes, in effect, a complex decision-making process. In addition, noting that a machine works on algorithms does not make that machine predictable, as shown by the Wikipedia algorithms which are correcting and deleting one another's information in unforeseen ways. 60 Machines and algorithms do not always work as they are supposed to, begging the question of at which point such unexpected algorithmic behaviour may amount to autonomy. Thus, as Jeangène Vilmer notes these three descriptions of human in/on/out the loop 'simplif[y] matters and do… not take into account the fact that autonomy does not consist of three levels, but rather it is a continuum of many degrees'. 61 These three categories are in many ways false and unhelpful. The same can be said, too, of definitions of autonomy and automation, in that 'these two categories are neither mutually exclusive nor homogeneous. There is no absolute distinction between automation and autonomy, but rather a continuum between the two'.
62 PAC-3 and SGR-A1 systems, for example, are already bridging this automated/autonomous distinction in that their programming is so complex that it can be seen as a very low level decision making process.
Part of the problem with the autonomy debate is that it tries to separate the machine from the human from the outset. Either the human is in the loop and thus controlling the machine, or on the loop, prevailing with ultimate control, or out of the loop, thus posing the machine as 'other', distinct and separate from the human. However, ultimately, these machines are all deeply connected to and work with the human in various ways, either through being operated by a human or, at the more advanced level, having been programmed by a human. Technology is changing the way we delegate tasks and make decisions but there is still human choice, even if in the programming alone.
It is clear, however, that for a system to be fully autonomous, i.e. able to create itself and others, some form of high-level intelligence would be needed. Artificial intelligence (AI), although hard to define precisely, is the possibility of the creation of an intelligent artefact.
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What intelligence means, however, is debatable. Theories include those which state that AI would have to be able to learn from experience to those which state that AI must be able to make connections and assumptions like a human can. 64 The Turing Test is often cited here as an appropriate measure of intelligence. Created in the 1950s, the Turing Test states that a machine should be considered to be intelligent if a human believes it to be another human. 65 This test has been shown to be faulty, however, with Dennett highlighting how many people 59 As above. 60 can be easily tricked into believing a fairly simple machine is human. 66 Yet as Ginsberg notes, the Turing Test may have its flaws -such as the human being too lazy to question the entity fully -yet it remains one of the most accepted tests of intelligence. 67 Ginsberg argues that this is because the test is difficult and thus sets a 'reasonably sharp description of intelligence', requiring the machine to discuss a very broad array of subjects. 68 The Turing Test, however, is a test of speech and not necessarily the other actions which may be deemed to constitute human intelligence, including eye contact and body language. 69 Since the test's creation in the 1950's, however, technology has dramatically advanced. The test also seems somewhat less rigorous in an age where technology is challenging ideas of what it means to be human. 70 In light of this, it seems that the Turing Test is not the only standard through which AI is and should be defined. What AI is and what it could constitute is hotly debated. If algorithms work as binaries between 0 and 1, it seems that AI, in making choices, would navigate these binaries. As noted above, however, the point at which binaries become so complex that they may constitute enough to be deemed intelligence remains unclear.
AI plays a key role in theories of the singularity (the idea that machines will eventually surpass human intelligence), representing the possible superintelligence required for the singularity and an accelerated post-capitalist world to come about. 71 Within weapons systems, however, AI presents a darker picture. A number of people have highlighted the risks around AI and the possibility that AI, whether created or not to kill, may choose to kill. 72 In addition to this, AI as purposefully embedded into weapons technology would clearly move weapons systems towards 'full' autonomy of the kind where the robots may not only make decisions and learn but can also create and programme themselves. AI does not yet exist in the realm of autonomous weapons, although there are a number of AI programmes and machines (arguably) in existence that are also being developed and tested, again depending on one's definition of AI. 73 For the most part these programmes remain limited, lagging far behind what could feasibly be dubbed human intelligence with most machines able to perform only one specific task (even if they perform that task very well). To develop a feminist posthuman approach to autonomous weapons systems, there is a need to understand the existing debates concerning these systems. This section summarises the key debates in this area.
Many groups have called for a pre-emptive ban of autonomous weapons. These groups include NGOs and the UN Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Execution. 75 Further to this, in 2015, over 20,000 AI, robotics and technology researchers and public intellectuals signed a letter calling for a 'ban on offensive autonomous weapons beyond meaningful human control'. 76 Another ban was proposed in August 2017, this time by 116 robotics and AI company leaders from 26 countries. 77 A number of states, notably all from the Global South, have also called for banning autonomous weapons, including Pakistan, Bolivia, Egypt and Ghana. 78 Over seventy religious leaders have called for a ban. 79 A number of philosophers have also joined the anti-group, arguing that machines should not be able to make life/death decisions. 80 A group of twenty Nobel Peace Prize winners called for a ban in 2014, and in the same year, the European Parliament adopted a non-binding resolution calling on Ministers of the EU and the EU's High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security to ban such weapons. 81 There are various legal, ethical and military debates around autonomous weapons. 82 Arguments include that the removal of humans from the field could drastically increase states' willingness to go to war due to the heavily reduced risk of military casualties. 83 Other arguments state that autonomous weapons could lead to a reduction in casualties as they do not have emotions and will thus never feel the need to uphold a 'shoot first ask questions later' policy. 84 The larger legal concern about these systems is whether a machine would ever be able to uphold International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Humans already make mistakes and break IHL, and there is very little doubt that machines would as well. Whilst roboticist expert Ron Arkin has argued that machines may better uphold the standards of IHL than humans, such an argument lacks nuance. 85 As Jeangène Vilmer notes, 'roboticists often exaggerate their ability to program IHL and convert legal rules into algorithms. Non-jurists often have a simplistic understanding of the rules, reducing them to univocal commands'.
86 IHL does not apply through binary choices but rather requires a balanced assessment of principles, perspectives and ethical standpoints. 87 One example of the way in which IHL does not just apply mathematically can be seen in the principle of proportionality, which requires 'incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects' to be balanced against 'the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated ' . 88 Yet determining what is proportionate or not is not simply a matter of logic. Proportionality requires a deep understanding of nuance, as shown by the number of legal debates surrounding this principle. 89 Another part of IHL which requires applying a nuanced reflection can be found under Article 57(2) of the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, which requires that the risk of civilian life should be minimised at all times and, in line with this, states must review the different forms an attack may take. 90 In order to abide by international legal obligations, these machines would have to be able to determine whether targets are military targets or not (and thus whether humans are military personal or civilians) and to make assessments on how to reduce damage in the most effective way possible, a decision which requires extremely intelligent thinking. For example, determining whether something is a rifle or an umbrella from a distance can be difficult. 91 Such a dilemma could not be easily evaded through creating a system which can read the code number on the side of weapons: first, this excludes analysis of unarmed civilians within the calculation, and second, not every person who carries a weapon is a combatant. In conflict situations, it can be common for civilians to carry weapons for self-defence, and if peacekeepers are present, they may also carry weapons, thus complicating identification more. 92 Further, even if a system were able to distinguish effectively between combatants and non-combatants, it would then also need to be able to understand when someone surrenders, in line with IHL. 93 It would also need to be able to determine when someone is seriously injured and split off from their group, thus making them an illegitimate target under IHL. 94 It is difficult to imagine a machine being able to make decisions such as these without it being highly intelligent.
Another key issue here is of accountability. Accountability when IHL is breached could be hard to determine where an autonomous weapon is involved, as the responsibility may lay across many actors. For example, if a machine kills an innocent person independently, should the military commanding the robot be held accountable? Or rather the manufacturer, the inventor, the commander, the programmer, or even in the case of AI machines, the robot itself? There is the further question of whether these machines are, in their very existence, compatible with IHL at all. states that all weapons systems must be verified as compatible with IHL before being used. 95 This debate also invokes the Marten Clause, which states that 'civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience'. 96 Whilst there is great debate as to what the Martens Clause means and how it exactly applies, it is questionable whether a machine being allowed to make life or death decisions may be in line with the principles of humanity and public conscience, with scholars taking positions on both sides of the debate. 97 There are many debates around the potential use of autonomous weapons. There have also been many proposals as to how to deal with them. As noted above, one proposal is to ban these systems. Bans are often justified on the basis of the need to retain 'meaningful human control', 98 though there is little clarity around what constitutes human control. 99 Any ban may prove difficult to enforce given the nuances in definition between autonomy and automation. 100 Parties wanting autonomous weapons draw on the lack of definitional clarity to promote their own agendas. 101 These ambiguities are used to deter any debate on weapons systems which do not meet "high-levels" of autonomy, even though such systems clearly still pose vast ethical dilemmas. Jeangène Vilmer thus believes that a better and 'wider option is to install safeguards'. 102 One of the safeguards he proposes is to only allow these weapons to be used against material targets such as tanks and aircraft. 103 Vilmer argues that such a restriction avoids the problem of allowing systems to decide whether someone is a combatant or a civilian. 104 However, the clear problem with this position is that anti-material machines can still kill people, as people are often in/with/next to material.
Alternatively, Arkin has proposed regulation of autonomous weapons via a test. 105 The Arkin Test states that a machine can be employed when it can be shown that it can respect the laws of war as well or better than a human in similar circumstances. 106 Some scholars have argued that if a machine passes this test, we have a moral obligation to deploy it, as it may work to uphold IHL better than ever before.kill less does not make those deaths acceptable. 109 Further to this, suggesting that these machines could follow IHL better than humans ignores the fact that IHL is not just a set of clear cut rules but requires very complex decision-making processes, 110 even within the confines of set Rules of Engagement. Arkin has suggested that these issues could be resolved with a backup system whereby the machine would refer to a human every time it has to make complex ethical decisions.
111 However, the decision as to whether a machine is or should be in doubt or not also remains complex and mistakes could still be made, leading Sparrow to declare that 'if we can't trust a machine to reliably make ethical judgements, we cannot trust it to identify when its judgements might be unreliable'. 
Challenging the Humanist Discourse around Autonomous Weapons: A Posthuman Analysis
Despite the challenges posed, calls for a ban remain strong. However, there are very large differences between the people who call for a ban. NGOs, for example, tend to take a humanitarian stance, noting the need to promote a humanist ethics and uphold the rules of IHL. Alternatively, however, there are those in this group who do not fundamentally come from a humanist background but come from the perspective of futurism.
113 Whilst the position of NGOs comes from the humanist discourse of IHL and the need to protect human life over all others, aligning more with the human dignity standpoint of religious leaders, some tech experts like Elon Musk fully embrace the posthuman future while working to ensure that this future remains ethical, albeit working within the confines of capitalism.
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The will to construct the future from the now can be seen through the project OpenAI, which Musk co-founded. 115 OpenAI is a project which seeks to disrupt the current corporate trend in AI research, where most of the research into AI is being done by large companies such as Google or in research centres such as MIT, with many of the findings of this research kept private in the hope of using them for profit. OpenAI is a non-profit organisation which seeks to disrupt corporate monopolies on AI research by committing to make all of its research and patents public, as well as through offering to work freely with any group or organisation.
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Noting the threat AI could pose to humanity, OpenAI aims to create a friendly General 109 As above 110 As above; Jeangène Vilmer above note 54. 111 Arkin above note 106; Jeangène Vilmer as above. 114 By 'the confines of capitalism' I am referring to the fact that Musk and those like him seem to seek to make a profit. To some extent this can be understood as a way of using the existing system for change. However, there are other tech movements which actively seek to rebut technology's capitalist tendencies. See, for example, Grinders who practise DIY biohacking i.e. using science and technology to hack their bodies Artificial Intelligence (GAI) -a system which can do more than just one thing such as speak or play chess; one which has 'human' characteristics. 117 OpenAI thus represents a clear, strategic effort to disrupt current trends in technology and AI development, including the will to make profit, aiming to bring a different ethical standpoint to the realm of AI research working, hopefully, to create a better future.
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All the groups who call for a preventative ban fundamentally agree that machines should not make life/death decisions. However, while NGOs seek to protect humans now within the confines of the present, with the risk of becoming out of date, futurist tech experts fundamentally believe that 'the best way to predict the future is to invent it'.
119 OpenAI represents a move towards shaping technological advancement now to prevent the existence of killer machines. Such aims are very similar to xenofeminist aims: the wish to appropriate technology for feminist aims. Whilst xenofeminism does not explicitly address the threat to life technology could pose, I argue that the wish to define and use technology for feminist aims inherently includes the wish to ensure that technology remains 'friendly'. 120 While OpenAI wishes to create a friendly AI, however, they do not explicitly define what 'friendly' means. Xenofeminism, on the other hand, is explicitly informed by a feminist ethos which seeks to ensure that 'friendly' means non-killer as a minimum. There is a need, as I will suggest, to bring these two bodies of thought together. Gender theory is required in this area due to its long history of theorising and applying a set of complex and nuanced tools which seek to promote equality and justice, these ethics forming what I argue should constitute 'friendly' technology.
While there is a need to ensure that IHL is upheld and that robots do not kill, it is also clear that this ethical dilemma does not just apply to autonomous weapons. While the organisations mentioned above clearly have at least some form anti-militarism as a core aim, 121 the temporal horizon of such NGOs remains limited. NGOs largely maintain a strict humanist stance, focusing on the realm of international law and the need to promote and protect existing legal frameworks such as IHL which situate the human at the centre of the paradigm. Whilst this has historically produced many great achievements, such a humanist stance cannot be applied given the rapid pace at which technology is now developing. AI may not only pose a threat to the lives of humans where designed, purposefully, to kill, but may also pose a threat to life in and of itself, as it exists. There is a need for all groups who are working to promote ethical technologies to consider not only what may seem attainable now, but what is feasibly attainable in the future, noting the ways in which the now can be used to construct the future.
NGOs continue to situate the human as the centre of their paradigm, seeing the machine as the 'other' to the human. This can be seen in the way in which autonomy is discussed in relation to the human who is imagined as either in/on/out of the loop, which does not account for the ways in which humans and machines work in connection.
122 Posthumanism, on the other hand, challenges the centrality of the human within Western thinking, working to re-117 Eliene Augenbraun, Elon Musk: Artificial Intelligence may be "more dangerous than nukes" (online) CBS News 2014 <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/elon-musk-artificial-intelligence-may-be-more-dangerous-thannukes/> (accessed 3 December 2017). think the human/machine binary. Feminist posthumanism notes that something else is needed; a new way of defining subjectivity which sees the complexities and interconnections between humans and others: nature, technology, animals, etc., rejecting the human as the central paradigm and noting how the human is located instead 'in the flow of relations with multiple others'. 123 The humanist discourse around autonomous weapons ignores the posthuman reality that humans and machines are already working in connection with one another. Life/death decisions are already being made by human-machine combinations, as the next section illustrates. Banning autonomous weapons is not enough: there is a need to consider the ways in which machines are already making these decisions and to create ethical frameworks for these and future technologies, rebutting the false exceptionalisation which surrounds the current discourse on autonomous weapons.
Machine-Human Life/Death Decision Making
As Jasanoff notes, technology is based around a set of decisions.
124 Jasanoff observes that we often do not question these decisions until there is an accident -at which point we find who made the mistake. 125 However, she argues that people 'have spent a great deal more energy thinking about how to make good laws than about how to design good technological objects ' . 126 Yet, she continues, 'in democratic societies, uncontrolled delegation of power is seen as a basic threat to freedom'. 127 We must 'understand how power is delegated to technological systems'.
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The need to understand how power and decision-making are delegated to technology is ever more urgent in the realm of life/death decision-making. However, as noted, the humanist discourse on autonomous weapons fails to account for the ways in which humans and machines are already working together to make life/death decisions. The most obvious example is the use of programming and algorithms in drone warfare. While many drone strikes are conducted as 'personality strikes' -i.e. strikes on a particular, key, well-known person -these occur only a few times a year, with 'signature strikes' happening a few times a week. 129 These attacks are conducted on the basis of a 'pattern of life' analysis. 'Pattern of life' analysis develops a profile of an individual or a network of individuals by drawing on all the intelligence available, which includes things like drone and other aerial surveillance intelligence, communications interceptions, as well as phone tapping information and GPS tracking information. 130 What becomes clear in 'drone warfare', therefore, is that the drone itself is only one part of a broader system which includes big data, algorithms, intelligence collection, chains of command, and bureaucratic formations, among other technologies and practices. 131 This data is then often combined with individual tracking through the use of mobile phone and GPS tracking systems in order to both watch movements as well as to 123 Braidotti above note 2 at 50. 124 Jasanoff above note 37. 125 As above. 126 As above. 127 As above at 11-12. 128 As above at 12. target individuals. 132 The gathering of this information builds up to create a file of information collected by machines which, as Chamayou has noted 'once it becomes thick enough, will constitute a death warrant '. 133 This is an example of part-machine life/death decision-making. Part of the decision-making process here is already done by machines which gather this data and predict the likelihood of an individual's involvement with terrorist organisations. While the human is clearly involved, in that they then must note the results of the data collected, deem it enough to act upon and then operate the drone to kill the subject in question, the machine and the human are making life/death decisions together. It is also worth nothing, as Wilcox has shown, the ways in which this data is often interpreted in racialised and gendered ways. 134 Such processes of human-machine life/death decision-making would not be covered under a ban of autonomous weapons. It thus seems that part of the problem with the debate around autonomous weapons is the debate around autonomy itself. By trying to define autonomy instead of working to understand automation and autonomy as in continuum, international debates on autonomous weapons other the machine from the human, creating a false paradigm. Such a limited account of autonomy works to set the standard so high for machine decision-making that, in the end, almost nothing may be covered under a ban. In the meantime, machines are already making of life/death decisions alongside humans. Machine involvement in such decision-making processes is only set to increase, as the next section will illustrate.
Cyborg Super Soldiers
As Vinge states, 'in humans, the hardest development problems have already been solved. Building up from within ourselves ought to be easier than figuring out first what we really are and then building machine that are all of that [as per AI]'. 135 While beyond human intelligence is often discussed in reference to AI, this is only one model. In fact, superintelligence and the singularity following it is likely to occur through what Vinge defines as Intelligence Amplification (IA). IA may include, for example, large computer networks waking up and becoming superhumanly intelligent or 'computer/human interfaces may become so intimate that users may reasonably be considered superhumanly intelligent'. 136 These two examples are different to AI as they either come from 'upgrading' the human or from the computer finding its own intelligence rather than coming from a specially created machine.
Given current trends and advancements in both wearable military technologies and human enhancement technologies, in contrast to the vast technological problems in creating a humanoid killer robot, the future of autonomous weapons may lie more in the enhancement of human soldiers than in the machinic 'other'. Superhuman soldiers, however, would not be covered under the kinds of legal bans being proposed. Of course, such a soldier would not necessarily be called a weapon and would pose a different set of legal and ethical questions considering that the entity would remain human to some extent, possibly retaining human choice capacity and empathy. 137 138 Following this line of argument, it is feasible to consider that attempts may be made to make superhuman soldiers emotionless to make them more efficient. It is at this point -where some parts of the soldier's humanity may be lost -that the ethics of autonomous weapons may begin to apply directly to cyborg soldiers. Superhuman soldiers thus exemplify the false binaries between autonomy and automation and the human and the machine in that they will likely embody all these things at once in a very direct way.
Recent trends in military technologies exemplify the trend towards creating enhanced human cyborg super-soldiers. Wearable military technologies are being developed to make human soldiers more efficient, as with exoskeletons. Designed to make soldiers stronger and to help disabled soldiers get back to work, the development and use of exoskeletons is one step towards the creation of super-soldiers. 139 Many of these wearable military technologies are being used not only to increase strength but to make life/death decision making more efficient. An example of such a technology can be seen in the Boomerang gunfire location system. Boomerang pinpoints the exact location of incoming small arms fire using acoustic detection and sophisticated algorithms. This information is then related directly to the soldier who can choose whether to fire or not. 140 Initially mounted onto trucks, there is now also a soldier wearable system called the Boomerang Warrior-X. While the system still requires a soldier to use the information given to choose whether to fire, these examples not only show the ways in which the human-machine are already working together to make life/death decisions, but also highlight the trend in working to create a new breed of super-soldier. If one merges the data collection and profiling used in drone warfare and gives this to a soldier in an exoskeleton using a system such as Boomerang Warrior-X, an early form of superhuman soldier can already be seen to be emerging.
While human enhancement technology is rather limited at this point, it is developing. One clear example of a research project which could contribute to the creation of superhuman soldiers can be seen in HRL's Information & System Sciences Laboratory's transcranial direct current stimulation project. 141 The researchers in this project 'measured the brain activity patterns of six commercial and military pilots and the transmitted these patterns into In the future, if technological subjects do gain personality, there could indeed be legal cases which ask the Courts to determine whether a subject is a human or an electronic subject. There is a great need to draw on scholars working on disability when it comes to these issues, especially those who note that disability is a socially constructed category and those who discuss the interaction between the body and matter. novice subjects as they learned to pilot an airplane in a realistic flight stimulator'. 142 The study found that 'subjects who received brain stimulation via electrode-embedded head caps improved their piloting abilities'. 143 This demonstrates a possible way to decrease the time it takes to learn complex skills, given that 'commercial and military pilot training programs [already] now utilize flight simulation extensively for training basic flight and combat skills'. 144 As the researchers on the project note, such a study could have massive 'benefits for commercial and military applications'. 145 This exemplifies a further way in which technology is being developed in various contexts with the idea of creating superhuman soldiers.
Given current trends in wearable military technologies and the large investment in human enhancement technologies globally, as opposed to the vast technological problems in creating a humanoid killer robot, 146 the future of autonomous weapons may not be solely machinic at all; rather, they are likely to take the form of a cyborg soldier. Discussions on autonomous weapons, however, continue to assert autonomous systems as the machinic 'other'. Such definitions which define these technologies before they exist may drastically limit the impact of any legal regulation despite the clear ethical and legal issues which arise from the possibility of any form of autonomous killer technology. It is clear that a feminist posthuman approach is needed on such technologies to ensure that the full range of technologies which may kill may be captured through legal regulation.
Conclusions
Despite current trends in military technologies and the ways in which machines are already helping to make life/death decisions, neither algorithmic 'independence', nor AI which decides to kill, nor any type of superhuman soldier would be covered under a pre-emptive ban of autonomous weapons. On the other hand, a posthuman approach to autonomous weapons would recognise the connections between the human and the machine. Such an approach would not fixate on autonomy but would instead work to break down the false dichotomies between autonomy-automation and human-machine, instead focusing on the ethical implications of killer systems across these lines. 147 As noted above, whilst xenofeminism and posthuman feminism understand the dangers as well as the potentials of technology, xenofeminism in particular does not account for the power of militarism and the militarism-capitalism assemblage. It seems, therefore, that the risks of the technologymilitarism-capitalism assemblage need to be further read into xenofeminism to ensure that it stays true to its own aims of using and appropriating technology to construct an intersectional feminist future.
Braidotti's posthumanism pays attention to death and modes of dying while promoting an affirmative posthuman era in the face of the necropolitical. 148 In contrast to the necropolitical It is a constant challenge for us to rise to the occasion, to be 'worthy of our times', while resisting them, and thus to practise amor fati affirmatively. It is quite demanding to catch the wave of life's intensities in a secular manner and ride on it, exposing the boundaries or limits as we transgress them... Death is the ultimate transposition, though it is not final, as zoe carries on, relentlessly.
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It seems hard, however, to read autonomous weapons in the affirmative when weapons technologies kill people in ever more removed and de-personalised ways. Autonomous weapons, are/will be the child of the military economy. As Braidotti notes, however, to analyse in the affirmative is not to deny the horror of our times. Affirmation 'proposes a different way of dealing with' such horrors.
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I propose that xenofeminism provides an affirmative blueprint for embracing the current times. I have noted how xenofeminist method works to appropriate technology and existing political structures, bending them to feminist aims. 153 While the current form of xenofeminism does not fully account for the links between technology and militarism, this does not mean that xenofeminism cannot accommodate such concerns. Xenofeminist method is an affirmative approach in that it notes the contradictions and risks in the posthuman condition and works to deconstruct them.
Thus, taking an affirmative posthuman-xenofeminist perspective, one which understands the ways in which the human and the machine are deeply interconnected, I wish to use xenofeminist method -the appropriation of technology for feminist aims -to propose a posthuman-xenofeminist discourse on autonomous weapons. While the XFM does not explicitly address the threat to life technology could pose, the wish to define and use technology for feminist aims, I have already suggested, inherently includes the wish to ensure that technology remains ethical. Taking this further, it is important to note that anti-militarism is a key part of the feminist project as exemplified by the Women's Peace Conference of 1915, to the feminist activism of Greenham Common to the ways in which Haraway, in her early foundational works, highlighted anti-militarism as a key feminist project. 154 While there are many feminists who do not promote an anti-violence stance, choosing to fight as part of their feminism, for example, this does not preclude an anti-militarism stance in the realm of military technologies. 155 Neither does an anti-militarism stance in this area wish to judge those who engage in fighting as part of their feminist project as 'not feminists', nor to associate feminism inherently with peace. Rather, in noting the history of anti-militarism within the international feminist project, I wish to suggest that there is a need to promote an ethics of anti-militarism at the international structural level. This is precisely because of the ways in which militarism structures the global order, working to structure technological innovation and development alongside forces such as capitalism, colonialism and other power structures. Such a stance must therefore be contrasted to more contextual scenarios, where fighting may indeed be the best form of feminist response. In this sense, anti-militarism must be distinguished from an anti-violence position, with anti-militarism aiming to challenge the industrial, technologically crafted, capitalist driven military complex and with an antiviolence position calling more broadly for peace and non-violence. It thus follows, given the links between militarism, technological advancements and capitalism, that xenofeminism, as a project aiming to appropriate technology for feminist aims, must have regard for antimilitarism. A xenofeminist appropriation of technology must therefore include the desire to ensure that the technology of the now and future cannot be used either for military gains or for the taking of human or nonhuman life.
156 Xenofeminist method provides an affirmative method for dealing with the current times and the issue of military technologies.
Drawing on the will to appropriate technology for feminist aims and to create the future from the present, manipulating, hacking and coding the system, it seems that the appropriation of technology includes ensuring that technology can only be developed in ethical ways. Technology is dependent on a set of programming choices which will shape machine intelligence as technology advances. What choices are made now, what programming choices are made in these current times, could structure the entire future of technology and machine intelligence. There is a need for feminist posthuman perspectives and xenofeminist infiltrations now.
The xenofeminists know well that it matters who makes those programming choices. As Haraway puts it, 'it matters which figures figure figures, which systems systematize systems'. 157 Noting that 'technology isn't inherently progressive', the xenofeminists call for an intervention in these choices. 158 While intelligent machines could indeed be the end of humanity, such machines may not make such choices. It is important to get the now right in the hope of working towards a future where the machine-human can work together ethically. As Haraway notes, 'the machine is use, our processes, an aspect of our embodiment. We can be responsible for machines: they do not dominate or threaten us. We are responsible for boundaries; we are they'.
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The XFM advocates the infiltration of multiple discourses. 160 I propose this could include law. I have argued that the discourse on autonomous weapons needs to be made posthuman, emphasising the links between the machine and the human and the ways in which seeing the autonomous weapon as the machinic other is a fallacy. Xenofeminist method calls for the appropriation of technology to promote, in Braidotti's terms, affirmative aims: constructing the future from the now. While many of the groups calling for a legal ban of autonomous weapons may be overlooking some of the nuances in the debate and definitions, their larger goal -to seek legal frameworks to regulate these systems -is an aim which can remain useful. After all, legal regulation is a core manner in which profit-making tech creators may be forced to shape their innovations in ethical ways. In other words, a xenofeminist method may include not only the appropriation of technology itself but also the frameworks which 156 See Alaimo and Hekman, above note 15. 157 Donna Haraway, 'Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: making Kin' (2015) 6 Environmental Humanities 159 at 160. 158 Laboria Cuboniks above note 2 at Zero 0*02. 159 Haraway above note 16 at 215. 160 Laboria Cuboniks above note 2 at Overflow 0*19. regulate it. These frameworks are key in structuring future developments of technology, and thus work to appropriate technology through structuring the creation of technology from the outset. In line with xenofeminist method, therefore, I propose that a legal framework is needed to ensure that feminist ethics of anti-militarism, justice and intersectionality remain central to technological innovation. A feminist posthuman understanding of technology is required here: to ensure that the dark sides of technology are evaded whilst technology's positive, subjectivity challenging and capitalism destroying potential is maintained. There is a need to focus on the regulation of all technologies, given the real possibility that killer machines may be created in multiple ways.
There have been steps in other contexts towards creating broader ethical regulations for technology. This can be seen in the example of the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017, which makes recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics. 161 The resolution is well thought out, considering a variety of issues around the legal regulation of technology and noting issues around liability, care robots, autonomous vehicles and privacy issues. 162 The resolution calls for the urgent need to regulate technologies. 163 While the resolution opens up debate on these issues, it is non-binding and seeks to regulate non-military technologies, thus upholding a false binary between military and civil technologies despite the clear cross-overs. As noted above, many civil technologies are originally created for military purposes, and there also remains a risk that civil intelligent technologies may decide to kill or may be easily adapted to make them kill. 164 In addition, the resolution does not consider human enhancement technologies despite emerging developments in this area. This trend towards focusing on the immediate present and towards categorising military and non-military technologies separately is repeated throughout legal and policy attempts to regulate these technologies. There is an urgent need for a posthumanxenofeminist infiltration of the discussions around the legal regulation of technology, working to promote a future-facing feminist posthuman perspective which understands the cross-overs between civil and military technologies, the human and the machine, and autonomy and automation. While technology may be largely controlled at present by a capitalist elite with strong ties to militarism, this does not mean this technology will inevitably remain in their hands and under their control. By ensuring that basic ethical principles are applied now, through the application of laws to regulate programming choices and technological innovation in the present, technology can be shaped, working towards a post capitalist, fairer, more ethical and just, feminist world.
